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Editorial: Ever Say Die? 
Ned H. Cassem, S.J., M.D. 
Three myths seriously obstruct 
the care of the critically ill. 
Caught between the crossfire of 
euthanasia societies and pro-life 
groups, ph y sic ian s are often 
blamed for not accepting over-
simplified solutions to complex or 
insoluble problems. Three of the 
commonest simplistic shibboleths 
earmarked for situations of criti-
cal illness are the following. (1) 
Medical care of the sick has been 
dehumanized by advanced tech-
nology. Although a convenient 
misplacement of responsibility, 
this myth is patently false. Tech-
nology never dehumanized any-
body. Human beings dehumanize 
other human beings. The means 
chosen are irrelevant, even though 
it is easier to blame the means 
rather than those who employ [or 
request] them. (2) "Natural" 
death occurs with "dignity." As 
reassuring as this maxim might 
be, it masks the separation, loss, 
debilitation, auguish, helpless-
ness, organ failure, and pain that 
are as naturally associated with 
dying as energy, vitality, and a 
sense of well being are associated 
with healthy living. (3) God gave 
life; H e will determine when it is 
to be taken away . God, it seems, 
was intelligent enough to leave 
this responsibility to lesser beings. 
This unthinking maxim apparent-
ly assumes that all technology 
available to prolong life must be 
used simply because it exists. If 
one acts according to this prin-
ciple, technology uses him, not he 
technology. Although decisions 
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made according to this reasoning 
are irresponsible and only in-
tensify the problems of the sick, 
t.hey follow a deceptively simple 
process. The welfare of the pa-
tient is not considered and he 
himself, like the physician, is pre-
sumed to have no choice in the 
matter. 
Slogans ring hollow in intensive 
care units, where life and death 
decisions are no longer theoreti-
cal issues. In this issue that de-
cision making process is not only 
explored historically, legally and 
ethically, but two authors report 
on their efforts to expose, guide 
and observe it as it happens on 
the spot - in the ICU itself. Dr. 
Tagge describes a treatment clas-
sification system he and others 
devised for the ICU at New 
York's Mt. Sinai Hospital. The 
classification presents four "de-
grees" of treatment: I. maximum 
therapy without reservation; II. 
same as I, but situation to be re-
evaluated; III. comfort measures 
only; IV. life sustaining measures 
can be stopped. This system 
forces the treatment team to 
formulate clearly and to specify 
openly what t.he treatment aim is 
at any given time and why. Com-
munication between physicians, 
consultants, h 0 use staff and 
nurses was essential and could not 
be avoided. This was the major 
purpose of the system. Decisions 
were no easier but reasons for 
adding, subtracting or withhold-
ing treatment had to be made ex-
plicit, so that any member of the 
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team could weigh them against 
the best interest of the patient. 
Dr. Shoemaker then reports the 
actual use of the classification 
system in 1000 consecutive ad-
missions to the ICU~ In so doing 
he provides evidence that such a 
system can be successfully and 
flexibly used - two patients in 
category IV, for example, recov-
ered. The system protects this 
possibility. Shoemaker, however, 
pinpoints the most difficult ques-
tion: what does "hopeless" or "ir-
reversible" mean? More precisely, 
(1) what is the probability that a 
given course of treatment will re-
store the patient's health, and (2) 
what will the restored state con-
sist of and will it justify the ef-
forts? Answers. to these two ques-
tions, if attainable at all , are the 
most basic and important " medi-
cal" facts in every decision. Un-
fortunately, this information may 
not become precise until treat-
ment is well under way. 
Fr. McCormick points out that 
life is not an absolute good nor 
death an absolute evil. Mere pres-
ervation of life for its own sake is 
therefore not an end compatible 
with J udaeo-Christian e t hie s . 
What means should be taken to 
preserve it, then? That is, how do 
we define "extraordinary" means 
- those which we have no obli-
gation to take in an irreversible 
illness? B ee a use quality-of-life 
judgments are involved, a danger 
lies in using only personal factors 
to determine ethical norms. Aq-
dressing himself to the related 
issue of ahortion ethics, McCor-
mick argues that John Fletcher's 
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recent attempt to differentiate 
fetus from newborn fails because 
it bases the differences on factors 
that are not normative - i.e. , 
constitutive of the essential per-
sonhood of the individual. He 
warns that decisions to treat or 
not, which must take into ac-
count personal perceptions, at-
titudes and desires, cannot stop 
there. As such, they are insuffi-
cient grounds for making norma-
tive ethical judgments. 
With a lawyer's sense of the 
rights of his client, George Annas 
confronts us with how often the 
patient is left out of the decision-
making about his treatment, and 
that his is the right to say what 
should or should not be done to 
him. To protect the rights of any 
ICU patient entering a treatment 
classification system, Annas de-
mands demonstration of four 
things: proper authority (ap-
proval of executive board of the 
hospital, and directors of the 
I CU), proper -documen ta tion (re-
cording of treatment classification 
in patient's permanent chart), 
adequate pre d i c t ion criteria 
(unanimity of me d i c a I views 
about salvageability), and ade-
quate patient representation (pa-
tient himself and/ or a "patient 
rights advocate" in the ICU) . 
Annas reminds us that reversal 
of nature's downhill course to-
ward death is precisely what in-
tensive care units were estab-
lished to provide. If there is even 
a small chance of restored health 
(how small no one has deter-
mined, but he sets the limit at 
two per cent), responsibility and 
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honor require an all-out effort on 
the part of ICU personnel. If any 
decision-making system deprives 
the patient of what voice he now 
has in the process, it should be 
opposed. 
We end where we began - with 
more questions than answers. 
Nevertheless, our decisions in in-
dividual cases will be improved if 
we can keep three questions and 
five checkpoints in mind. (1) 
What are the chances of this per-
son's restoration to health? (2) 
Will the patient be sufficiently 
restored to health to justify the 
effort, or will the "grave incon-
venience" (Pius VII's word) 
make the means "extraordinary"? 
Answers to these first two ques-
tions should cover five check-
points: (a) technological (what 
can be done and what treatments 
are available to reverse the down-
hill course of the illness? how ef-
fective will the treatment be?) ; 
(b) socioeconomic (how limited 
are the resources of the family, 
the community, and society?); 
(c) moral/e thical (how is this in-
dividual decision justified by cri-
teria and norms that are constitu-
tive of human personhood in gen-
eral?); (d) legal (what does the 
patient say? are his rights in-
fringed upon?); (e) psychological 
(what irrelevant motives bias the 
decision - e.g., patient's being 
disliked, poor, arriving for treat-
ment at 3 a.m., etc?) . 
Answering the first two ques-
tions accounts for almost all the 
energy expended in arguments 
about treating the hopelessly ill. 
One of the strongest incentives to 
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prolong these disputes is the near-
ly complete avoidance of the third 
and final question. (3) Whether 
the decision is to save or let die, 
how does one conduct oneself iIi 
the face of imminent death? Al-
most every a d m iss ion to an 
ICU requires this encounter for 
patient and staff. Admission is 
justified, in fact, by the danger to 
life present with the patient efse-
where. In treating the critically 
ill patient, some talk as though 
making the decision to escala:te 
or limit treatment solves the 
problem. It is rather then when 
the task becomes most difficult. 
How are we to take care of the 
individual for whom further ef-
forts to save are inappropriate? 
He may remain fully conscious, or 
if he is not, his family are. While 
some treatment efforts are modi-
fied or withheld, others must now 
be intensified. Preparation and 
support of the family throughout 
illness are as much a part of' our 
responsibility to them as provid-
ing semi-miraculous technologies. 
Whenever a person lies mortally 
ill, hopefully he, his physician, 
family and staff can share the 
burden and confront together the 
realities that often dwarf them 
all. Although there are some 
heroic measures that need not be 
used for irreversibly ill patients, 
some always remain necessary: 
namely, extraordinary sensitivity, 
extreme responsibility, her oi c 
compassion. For care itself must 
continue to the end of life and 
never cease to be total, even when 
major facets of it are duly limited' 
or stopped. 
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